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VIETNAM AND THE 1968 ELECTION

THE EDITORS

THE REVELATIONS ABOUT THE CIA

H. H. WILSON

The Day the Cops Smiled

ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Important: MR Press is proud to announce immediate publication of Bertrand Russell's *War Crimes in Vietnam*. This book was published in England by George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., and we have just arranged for American publication. We are doing one of the quickest production jobs in MR history, so that by the time you read these lines and send us your order, the book will be available for you. *War Crimes in Vietnam* is a powerful and angry statement by one of the great minds and consciences of this century. It is a collection of Lord Russell's speeches and articles which includes a concise history of the war and American involvement, and

(*continued on inside back cover*)

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VIETNAM AND THE 1968 ELECTION

The Johnson administration has been steadily escalating the war in Vietnam since the end of the New Year's bombing pause, and all indications are that further major steps in the same direction will soon be taken. That this is the meaning of Westmoreland's highly publicized return to the United States is taken for granted in Washington. Thus John Herbers reported immediately after Westmoreland's speech to Congress:

> There was almost universal agreement among members of Congress today after Gen. William C. Westmoreland's address that the war in Vietnam was likely to be intensified.
>
> Critics of the administration's military policy in Southeast Asia said with resignation that the general's appearance was apparently designed to prepare the way for a greater war. . . .
>
> Senator Fulbright . . . said he believed the administration had brought General Westmoreland on a speaking tour of this country and before Congress as a calculated effort to "pave the way for escalation."
>
> "Developments during the past several weeks, the increased bombings, and other things all point to a much wider war," he said. "The general was preparing the ground for it." . . .
>
> Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said the speech "separates the men from the boys."
>
> "The immortal words of Stephen Decatur, 'my country right or wrong,' could never be truer," he said. "It's too late to question whether it's right or wrong." (*New York Times*, April 29.)

As to the timing of the escalation there seems to be hardly more doubt. Wrote Tom Wicker in his April 27th column in the *New York Times*:

> All of this [indications of escalation] can only mean that since the failure to get peace talks under way in January and February, President Johnson has determined on an enormous gamble. He has decided to seek a military decision over North Vietnam on the mainland of Asia, and the probability is that his timetable has been

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stepped up in an effort to produce an end to the war well before the 1968 election.

In other words, to put it quite baldly, Johnson is now about to gamble tens of thousands of Vietnamese and American lives to improve his electoral chances next year. He wants to regain his popularity, restore his authority in the Democratic Party, and establish a reputation as a great statesman. To do so he must appear before the voters in 1968 as a victor whose political and military judgment has been vindicated.

What are the chances that this strategy will succeed? Close to zero, for two reasons. (1) The war in the South is a revolutionary war which has long since passed the point beyond which it could be "won" by the counter-revolutionary side. And (2) North Vietnam cannot be invaded and occupied (in the sense that South Vietnam now is) without bringing in China and involving the Soviet Union in a much bigger commitment than it has yet made. For either or both reasons, Johnson's hopes of bringing the war to an early end are destined to be disappointed. Let us look at the two points a little more closely.

(1) "Revolutionary warfare," writes Eqbal Ahmad who has both studied it and observed it at first hand in Algeria, "does not require only discontent among the masses but also a sense of desperation and a grim determination to end injustice and humiliation. It demands patience, prolonged suffering, and a determined conspiracy of silence and militancy."* Nowhere have these conditions and qualities been developed to so high a degree as in Vietnam. The purpose of revolutionary war is only partly military; more fundamentally it is to isolate totally the old regime from the masses of the people and simultaneously to begin the construction of a new and just society. Once these objectives have been achieved, no conceivable military effort by

* Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare," in *Alternative Perspectives on Vietnam: Report on an International Conference* (The Inter-university Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy, P.O. Box 71, Ithaca, N. Y., $1.00), p. 52. Ahmad's piece is an extraordinarily penetrating and lucid analysis. The *Report* also contains other valuable material, most notably "The Forgotten Element in the Vietnam Discussion: the Facts" by Mortimer Graves, Executive Director Emeritus of the American Council of Learned Societies, which pitilessly exposes the whole tissue of lies which have been concocted to justify the American aggression in Vietnam.

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the counter-revolutionary side can restore "law and order"; the most it can achieve is to prolong fighting and prevent the revolution from consolidating its power. In the process, the counter-revolution may win any number of purely military victories; what it cannot do is to bring the past back to life again. "The Algerian revolution," Eqbal Ahmad reminds us, "was actually crushed militarily but had won politically when de Gaulle negotiated independence."* The South Vietnamese revolution won politically as long ago as 1954, as proved again and again by the utter failure of a whole series of "pacification" campaigns by Diem and his successors. Westmoreland, too, will undoubtedly win military victories. What is not conceivable is that he and/or his Vietnamese stooges will be able to end the fighting, still less to govern South Vietnam.

(2) It should be clear by now to everyone with any sense of history that North Vietnam cannot be bombed into surrender. Hanoi and Haiphong and other cities may be razed, as many German and Japanese cities were razed during the Second World War. If so, they will be evacuated, and the North Vietnamese economy and society will be reduced to a subsistence level in the countryside. In the meantime, while bombing from the air yields continuously diminishing returns, its costs will rise as North Vietnam's allies steadily improve the country's air defenses. Since bombing is thus a strategic blind alley, the Johnson administration, in its frantic hunt for quick victory, will be more and more tempted to try an invasion of North Vietnam. If it succumbs to this temptation, the North Vietnamese will obviously have no more reason for not requesting direct Chinese help; and the Chinese will have every reason, both political and military, to meet the request. The United States will then be bogged down in the full-scale war on the Asian mainland against which a long and distinguished succession of military strategists has emphatically warned. There is nothing new in the present situation to make these warnings less relevant now than they have been in the past. No wonder Walter Lippmann cries out in anguish:

* *Ibid.*, p. 51.

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A measure of how the situation has worsened can be found in some remarks made by Gen. Westmoreland last week [April 9-15]. He said that he knew of no better way to win the war than "to go on bleeding" our adversary. The spectacle of an American commander committed by his government to a war of attrition on the Asian mainland, committed to spending American lives in some exchange ratio against Asian lives, is a startling illustration of what has happened to American military and diplomatic leadership in this war. Imagine Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Eisenhower, Gen. Ridgway, Gen. Bradley, imagine any of the military leaders and thinkers in our history being placed in a position where the defense of freedom on the globe depended on matching American lives against the manpower of Asia!

There are of course those who argue that if China comes into the war, the hands of the United States will then be freed to bomb China. No doubt. But if North Vietnam cannot be bombed into surrender, what reason is there to suppose that China, with its 700 million people dispersed over an area larger than the United States, can be? What General Gavin wrote over a year ago is as true today as it was then: "To increase the bombing and to bomb Hanoi—or even Peking—will add to our problems rather than detract from them."*

Only one conclusion is possible, that short of withdrawal from Vietnam there is no way the United States can end the war in Vietnam this year or next year or at anytime in the foreseeable future. Johnson's strategy is doomed: the chances are that the image he presents to the American voter in 1968 will be that of a mad butcher with nothing but failure to show for his bloody crimes and blunders.

There is of course opposition in the United States ruling class to the Johnson strategy and presumably a growing understanding of where it is leading. How strong is it and what are the chances that it will prevail?

In seeking answers to these questions it will be helpful to review the postwar history of United States policies in Asia. During the first few years after the surrender of Japan there was substantial unity in the American ruling class on Asian policy. The keystone was to be Chiang Kai-shek's China which

* "A Communication on Vietnam" from General James M. Gavin, *Harper's Magazine*, February, 1966.

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it was hoped to convert into a combination of world's largest and most lucrative neo-colony and junior partner in the control and exploitation of the rest of the Far East. With the collapse of the Chiang regime and the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, this unity in the United States ruling class was shattered.

Two main lines began to emerge almost at once: one advocating a "forward" policy of aid to Chiang Kai-shek and active United States military intervention on the mainland, the other advocating a more moderate "wait-and-see" policy. At the outset the forward group was rather small, consisting mostly of military men and right-wing Republicans. As far as the great majority of the "power elite" was concerned, including its most prestigious generals, the sudden collapse of their entire Asian policy left them in a state of stunned confusion. For the time being, they were content to follow the advice of the State Department's famous China White Paper (compiled under the Secretaryship of Dean Acheson) to "let the dust settle."

This period, which lasted about a year beginning around the middle of 1949, saw a marked decline in the fortunes of Asian reactionaries. The Truman administration publicly disavowed Chiang's regime on Taiwan; the Huk rebels scored successes in the Philippines; Syngman Rhee's position in South Korea rapidly deteriorated. The Asian counter-revolution and its close American allies in the "forward" camp decided that matters were getting desperate and that something would have to be done about it. They therefore cunningly laid a trap in South Korea into which the North Koreans rashly fell. The outbreak of the Korean War altered the balance of forces overnight: the Truman administration invaded the Asian mainland under cover of a UN mandate and simultaneously reversed its policy toward Chiang Kai-shek. Soon after, John Foster Dulles, a right-wing Republican and one of the architects of the Korean War, was commissioned to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan which would lay the basis for a new Washington-Tokyo Axis to take the place of the shattered Washington-Nanking Axis. The "forward" group, now in the ascendancy, proceeded in the fall of 1950 to score its greatest triumph: MacArthur's invasion

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of North Korea which Truman and the UN were bulldozed into endorsing after it had already been launched.

The Chinese, however, could not be so easily cowed. As MacArthur's troops approached the Yalu River in the winter of 1950-1951, the Chinese struck back hard and the Korean War entered an entirely new phase. So also did the political struggle at home. MacArthur wished to convert his defeat at the hands of the Chinese into an excuse for carrying the war into China. Confronted with this prospect, Truman and his advisers (including Generals Marshall and Bradley) took fright. A dramatic showdown ensued: MacArthur was deliberately insubordinate; Truman fired him; MacArthur came home to appeal over the President's head to the people and their representatives in Congress—and failed.* The drive of the "forward" group was now halted, and Washington reverted once again to a more cautious Asian policy.

The next bid of the "forward" group came with the impending collapse of the French in Indo-China. This time Dulles, now Secretary of State, was the chief organizer and leader; within the government he was backed by such powerful figures as Vice President Nixon and Admiral Radford (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Their plan was to intervene militarily on behalf of the French, knowing full well that this would soon mean taking over the war entirely. (Washington was already paying something like four fifths of the cost of the French effort in Indo-China, and the political situation in France was such that withdrawal of French troops was mandatory on any government hoping to remain in power.) But President Eisenhower, on the urgent advice of the Army, refused to go along; as in 1951, the "forward" group was once again defeated. It is worth recalling today what General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Army Chief of Staff, said about this episode in his memoirs:

> In Korea we had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either. It was incredible to me that we had forgotten that bitter lesson so soon—that we were on the verge of making the same tragic error.

* Later, after his retirement, MacArthur strongly advised against getting into a land war against China.

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That error, thank God, was not repeated. . . . The idea of intervention was abandoned, and it is my belief that the analysis which the Army made and presented to higher authority played a considerable, perhaps a decisive, part in persuading our government not to embark on that tragic adventure.

Following his failure to achieve military intervention on the Asian mainland in 1954, Dulles found it necessary to resort to more cautious and devious methods of achieving his aims in Asia.* One key move was to conclude a military alliance with Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Taiwan, an arrangement which, as long as it existed, was guaranteed to make impossible any rapprochement between the United States and China. And another step was to construct, in the same year of 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which brought three Asian countries (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines) directly under the American military wing and was drafted in such a way as to give the United States the semblance of an international mandate to "protect" the independent successor states to French Indo-China (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) which had been agreed to at the Geneva Conference of 1954.

As to Indo-China itself, Dulles's strategy was to set up a separate puppet state in South Vietnam—in clear violation of the Geneva Agreements which solemnly affirmed the unity of Vietnam and which the United States had publicly stated its intention not to subvert. His calculation was that a regime similar to that of Syngman Rhee in South Korea could be established

* About the aims as such there was neither any mystery nor any dispute within the ruling class. They were succinctly set forth in testimony by Walter S. Robertson, Dulles's Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, at a hearing before the House Appropriations Committee on January 26, 1954. The questions are by Representative Frederic R. Coudert, the answers by Robertson:

"*Q.* Did I correctly understand you to say that the heart of the present policy toward China and Formosa is that there is to be kept alive a constant threat of military action vis-à-vis Red China in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown?

"*A.* Yes, sir, that is my conception.

"*Q.* Fundamentally, does that not mean that the United States is undertaking to maintain for an indefinite period of years American dominance in the Far East?

"*A.* Yes. Exactly." (Quoted in Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, p. 631.)

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in South Vietnam and maintained in power by liberal handouts of military and economic assistance. This would erect a barrier to the spread of communism (i.e. revolution) and make possible the consolidation of United States control over the whole area of Southeast Asia. That this was the real goal of American policy had been clearly indicated by President Eisenhower when, as reported in the *New York Times* of August 5, 1953, he told a conference of state governors that "losing" Indo-China would be "of most terrible significance to the United States of America, our security, our power and ability to get things we need from the riches of . . . Southeast Asia."

At the time there was no significant opposition to this policy in the American ruling class, any more than there had been to propping up and relying on Chiang Kai-shek at the end of the Second World War. And yet in the one case as in the other, failure was inevitable, and for the same reason. The revolutionary process had already passed beyond the point of no return in Vietnam: the Vietnamese people had become quite literally ungovernable by a regime of domestic and foreign exploiters. This truth of course did not emerge into the light of day all at once; in fact, it was a full decade before the puppet state finally collapsed. During this period the steady weakening of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors could be lied about, its failures denied or explained away; and ever new promises of success just around the corner could be issued in Washington and Saigon.* But the hour of truth could not be delayed forever: by mid-1964 the puppet armies had been defeated in battle or were melting away; like ripe fruit, power was about to fall into the outstretched hands of the National Liberation Front.

The hour of truth in Vietnam was the hour of decision in Washington. Once again, as in 1954, the United States had to choose between accepting what had actually happened on the field of battle and throwing in its own forces in an attempt to

* On this, see the review article by Hugh Deane, "The Permanent Promise: A Critique of the Liberal Books on Vietnam," which begins on page 40 below.

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reverse the military verdict. And this time, unlike in 1954, the decision was made to Americanize the war.

It is not clear when this decision was made, but it was almost certainly before the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 4, 1964, which was obviously cooked up by the Pentagon and used by Johnson as a pretext for getting the Congress to pass a Joint Resolution that Senator Morse, speaking on the Senate floor on August 5th, correctly labelled a "predated declaration of war."

Was there any opposition within the administration to this decision? If so, it has never been publicized and it cannot have been very significant. In 1954, the Army of which General Ridgway was then Chief of Staff, had, as we have already noted, strongly opposed the "forward" policy. This time, with one Army officer Chief of Staff of the Army and another Army officer occupying the highest military position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, there was apparently no such opposition. And Johnson, unlike Truman in 1952 and Eisenhower in 1954, joined the "forward" camp (when the facts are known, it may even turn out that he was its leader). Even in the Senate the opposition to the "predated declaration of war" was extremely feeble and did *not* include Senator Fulbright, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who has since become the leading Senatorial critic of the policy of escalation.

Nor is there any reason to believe that strong opposition existed in ruling-class circles outside the government. Has this situation significantly changed in the last two and a half years of steady escalation? If so, there is not much evidence of it. The circle of Senatorial critics has increased somewhat but remains small. No prestigious military figures have joined Generals Gavin and Ridgway in warning of the perils of an expanded war on the Asian mainland. Walter Lippmann remains a pretty lonely figure in the journalistic world, though occasionally *New York Times* columnists James Reston and Tom Wicker sound as though they would like to do more than merely raise questions. One hears stories about opposition to the war in business circles, especially, it is said, among east-coast financiers; we have no reason to doubt that such opposition exists,

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but so far at any rate it has been too discreet and private to give any clues to its size and intensity. As far as the public record goes, one can only conclude that the American ruling class in general approves of Johnson's war policy.

One can go further and say that even those elements in the ruling class which do not approve are either unwilling or unable to propose an alternative that has any better chance of succeeding (success of course being judged from a ruling-class point of view). The only way to end the war, we repeat, is for the United States to withdraw and leave Vietnam to the Vietnamese. Unless and until that happens, or at least is promised in terms that satisfy a people who have been grossly deceived and cheated by promises before, the fighting will go on. And yet Senator McGovern, in a recent Senate speech in which he eloquently pictured the horror and the hopelessness of the Johnson course, felt it necessary to emphasize that not a single Senatorial critic of the war had ever advocated United States withdrawal.

It is against this background that one must evaluate the prospect, now much under discussion, that the Republicans will run an anti-war candidate in 1968. We do not question that the possibility of such a candidacy exists or that it would stand a good chance of electoral success. The war in Vietnam is unpopular and getting more so, and Johnson's political fortunes are indissolubly tied to it. He will be relatively easy to beat next year, and a peace candidate would probably have the best chance of turning the trick. The Republican Party is of course well aware of this state of affairs and is making preparations to capitalize on it (as, for example, in the well publicized "Blue Book" on Vietnam issued by the Senate Republican Policy Committee on May 1), while a number of aspiring candidates—most notably Senator Percy of Illinois and Mayor Lindsay of New York—are seeking to establish reputations as opponents of the war.

What is not clear, however, is whether a Republican in the White House, no matter what platform he might be elected on, would make much difference. Remember that Johnson ran as a peace candidate in 1964 and promptly escalated the war. The explanation, put in its simplest form, is that the military-in-

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dustrial complex in Washington and across the country wanted a bigger war and no significant element of the ruling class was seriously opposed. If this situation had really changed, a Republican President might be able to de-escalate and at least explore the possibilities of finding some acceptable way to withdraw from Vietnam. But if, as our analysis above seems to indicate, there has been no significant shift in the balance of forces within the ruling class, a peace candidacy in 1968 will mean no more than Johnson's peace candidacy did in 1964.

Of course things may change in a way to put the 1968 election in a different light. Once before, in 1951-1952, the advocates of the "forward" policy in Asia were riding high and yet were unable to achieve what was then their major goal, the extension of the Korean War into China. Paradoxically, what frustrated their drive was determined military action by the Chinese. A comparable situation could arise in Vietnam if the Johnson administration decides to invade the North. Confronted again by the reality of a land war with China, a powerful part of the ruling class might wish to draw back, as it did in 1952. In that case the 1968 election might become the arena for resolving a genuine struggle within the ruling class.

However that may be, it seems crystal clear to us that those who are really for peace, and not simply against wars the United States may lose, should steer scrupulously clear of ruling-class electoral politics. The whole history of the postwar period irrefutably proves that no section of the American ruling class is opposed to the imposition of United States domination on the largest possible part of the world: they differ only on the definition of "largest possible" at any given time. And if, what now seems highly unlikely, a group favoring withdrawal from Vietnam should get into power, its purpose would only be to conserve American power for more effective use elsewhere against people struggling for liberation and the right to decide their own destinies.

A peace movement worthy of the name in the United States must take its place at the side of these struggling peoples and not line up with this or that faction of the ruling class every time an election comes around. And while it must agitate against—

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and educate around—every war, its deeper purpose must be to change the character of the United States from the war-making imperialist aggressor it now is to a genuinely peaceful nation respecting the right of other nations to shape their own future.

In the long run, this deeper purpose can be achieved only by a profound social revolution, a fact which the new radicalism of the 1960's is coming to understand. But that does not mean that nothing can be done now. Until we can change the system, our primary aim must be to weaken it, to reduce as much as possible its capacity to fight wars of aggression against other peoples. And that in turn means doing everything possible to deprive it of the military manpower without which all its vaunted planes and bombs and guns are so much junk.

The really effective peace movement today is much smaller than the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators who marched in New York and San Francisco on April 15th. But its potential is much greater. It consists in the first instance of those who bravely defy the draft or refuse to go to Vietnam, and behind them of those who in various ways encourage these acts of defiance and resistance. As of now the outstanding figures are Muhammad Ali, Stokely Carmichael, and Martin Luther King, Jr. It is no accident that they are all blacks, for United States imperialism not only oppresses and exploits black Americans but cynically uses them as mercenaries to oppress and exploit people of color all over the world.

As to the potential power of this still-small movement of resistance to military service, it will be enough to quote from two recent columns in the *New York Times*. The first appeared on May 2 under the title "In the Nation: Muhammad Ali and Dissent" and is by Tom Wicker. Raising the question, "if large numbers of these dissenters simply refused military service, what could the government of a democracy do?" Wicker proceeds:

> A hundred thousand Muhammad Alis, of course, could be jailed. But if the Johnson administration had to prosecute 100,000 Americans in order to maintain its authority, its real power to pursue the Vietnamese war or any other policy would be crippled if not destroyed. It would then be faced not with dissent but with civil disobedience on a scale amounting to revolt.

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Is there any chance that a resistance movement of such magnitude may develop? Perhaps Reston's column of May 5th ("Washington: Compromise on the Military Draft") gives us a clue to an answer. According to Reston, one of the reasons why the Senate Armed Services Committee shied away from advocating the ending of undergraduate draft deferments is that "it might inflame opposition on the university campuses into a national crisis." He then goes on:

> Officials discuss this latter point very cautiously, but it is a factor. The opposition in the universities to the Vietnam war is already an embarrassment and an irritation to the administration. But there is genuine fear here [Washington] that abolition of all or most college deferments might lead to massive defiance among undergraduates. One estimate here is that if college students were called like any other nineteen-year-olds, as many as 25 percent might refuse to serve.

Washington's fears may be exaggerated, but whether or not that is the case they point very clearly to the Achilles Heel of American imperialism. And they give us the right to hope that the United States may yet develop the most effective peace movement of our time.

(May 8, 1967)

When a government takes the life of a man without the consent of his conscience, it is an audacious government, and is taking a step towards its own dissolution.

—*Thoreau*

No laws are binding on the human subject which assault the body or violate the conscience.

—*Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765*

I for one will speak against war so long as my voice will last, now and during the war. A thousand times rather would I die calling to the people of America to refuse to be obedient, to refuse military service, to refuse to murder their brothers, than I should ever give my voice in justification of war, except the one war of all the peoples against their despots and exploiters—the Social Revolution.

—*Emma Goldman, March, 1917*

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THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT IN PHILOSOPHY

BY DONALD CLARK HODGES

Concurrently with the recent break in Sino-Soviet joint political action, the Chinese are in the process of re-interpreting Marxist philosophy in more revolutionary terms than the established Russian version. Following the criticism in the early 1960's of Soviet political revisionism, an effort was launched in the first half of 1966 to complete the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China as the most important guarantee against the revival of bureaucracy and the betrayal of socialist ideals. This Cultural Revolution has led to an implicit re-assessment of the role of philosophy in the revolution. A concerted effort has been made to integrate Marxist philosophy, first, with the Chinese masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers; and second, with the requirements of the world revolution and the national liberation movements of underdeveloped countries.

The upshot of these efforts is a version of Marxist philosophy quite at odds with the official Soviet interpretation. Marxist philosophy in the Soviet Union is divided into: (1) a scientific world-view or general theory of the universe (dialectical materialism); (2) a scientifically based theory of knowledge and corresponding method of inquiry (materialist dialectics); and (3) a scientific theory of social structures and the historical process (historical materialism). So conceived, Marxist philosophy is a comparatively professionalized though integral part of Marxism-Leninism. Unlike Marxist philosophy, which is basically a theoretical discipline in the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism comprises a unity of theory and practice. In addition to Marxist philosophy it includes Marx's critique of capitalism and the theory, strategy, and tactics of the transition to socialism.

Although the distinguishing characteristics of the Chinese

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interpretation have not as yet been formalized, much less publicized, they consist fundamentally of the following: First, no hard and fast line is drawn between Marxist philosophy and Marx's scientific works. On the contrary, Marxist philosophy has been de-professionalized and given a practical orientation through identification with Marxism-Leninism. In the Chinese view the philosopher is a man of deeds rather than words, a revolutionary in theory for the sake of practice. Second, the theoretical function of philosophy is methodological rather than doctrinaire. Less important than a materialist world-theory is the scientific method of arriving at it.

Mao's major contributions to philosophy, *On Practice* and *On Contradiction,* are supposed to penetrate to the kernel or core of Marxist thought. Unlike the primacy assigned to a philosophical theory of the universe in Stalin's still influential essay, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism,* Mao's approach is directed to methodological issues. Fundamental to Marxist philosophy for Mao and his Chinese followers is not Lenin's scientifically based interpretation of the world, but rather his theory of knowledge—especially its bearing upon revolutionary action. In Mao's two essays, materialism and idealism are preeminently methods of inquiry rather than theories of the fundamental substance and structure of being. They are ways of knowing or explaining development and social change in particular.

Marx's materialism was likewise basically methodological in orientation. Its classic exposition, the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* consists of a series of guidelines to specifically historical research. In fact, his term "material" designates the economic conditions of life in contrast to the "ideal," which is nothing other than the material conditions reflected by the human mind and translated by it into forms of thought. Although this materialistic premise may seem to involve a general theory of the relation of mind to matter, its primary function was to serve as a principle of social inquiry, i.e., to induce explanations of social consciousness in terms of economic forces and social and political relations.

The primacy assigned by Mao to Marx's method explains

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the difference between the Chinese and Russians. For both, the fundamental methodological question is the relation of theory to practice. The disagreement is over the role of dialectics or the Marxist theory of knowledge within Marxist philosophy. Since in Soviet textbooks the fundamental problem of philosophy is the very general one of the relation of thought to being, it follows that problems of method are of secondary importance.

The Chinese do not accept the Soviet distinction between Marxist philosophy and Marxism-Leninism. Following Soviet textbooks, the supreme principle of the latter is the unity of theory and practice. This principle has particular significance at the present time when Marxist-Leninist theory has become directed to practical tasks associated with the building of communism; however, it is most fully embodied not in the writings of Soviet philosophers, but in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Marxist philosophy, in Soviet terms, is only a small segment of Marxism-Leninism. For the latter includes, in addition to the philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism, also Marx's and Lenin's contributions to economics, the theory and tactics of the international communist movement, and of the transition from socialism to communism.

For the Chinese, philosophy is not something scholastic, but includes day-to-day practice. From their point of view, Soviet philosophy is an academic discipline separable from the basic activities of revolutionaries. Despite Soviet claims to the contrary, Soviet philosophy is judged to be a primarily theoretical activity focused upon the basic substance and structure of reality. This conception of philosophy is precisely the one criticized by Marx. The point of Marx's revolution in philosophy, according to Chinese Marxists, was not to interpret the world scientifically so much as to revolutionize it in practice. And this is how they interpret Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it."

The supreme principle of Marxist philosophy and not just of Marxism-Leninism, then, is held to be the transformation of theory into practice. Marxist philosophy has two outstanding characteristics: first, its class function to serve the proletariat;

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second, its practicality, practice being the foundation of theory which in turn serves as a guide to policy. On the theoretical front, dialectics becomes a method of investigating and resolving social conflicts. But to cite Mao's *On Practice,* "What Marxist philosophy considers most important is not understanding the laws of the external world and thereby explaining it, but actively changing the world by applying the knowledge of objective laws." For the Chinese, the most important contribution of Marxist philosophy is not its theory of the general laws of conflict nor its function as a revolutionary guide to action and instrument of practical decision, but rather revolutionary action itself.

It follows that Marxist philosophy is not only indirectly dedicated to transforming the world through combating metaphysics at the cultural level, but also directly and even immediately concerned with changing the economic structure of societies. The point of Marxist philosophy is to get prompt results from what you have learned, by linking study with current tasks and personal problems, and by concentrating upon those problems that most urgently need to be solved. In this light, philosophy is occupied less with changing ways of thinking than with changing social institutions. To revolutionize the world on the basis of scientific knowledge of it, and not just the dissemination of dialectics as a theory and technique of decision-making, is the most urgent and immediate task of philosophy according to Chinese lights. It marks a new epoch in the development of Marxism-Leninism, in which philosophy as revolutionary activity is given precedence over philosophy as a scientifically based guide to action. For the Chinese, it is the era in which workers, peasants, and soldiers master Marxist-Leninist theory and collectively apply it. It is Mao Tse-tung's era of the mass line in philosophy, which teaches that Marxist philosophy is for the masses rather than for a small minority of intellectuals.

The transformation of materialist dialectics from abstruse theory into direct action is regarded by the Chinese as the most important single guarantee of the world victory of socialism against the restoration of capitalism in socialist countries and against Soviet revisions of Marxism. Hence the concerted effort

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in China to apply philosophy directly to the solution of such problems as the treatment of burns, methods of fighting drought and floods, the construction of frequency clocks, the production of turbo-generators with water-cooled stator and rotor, the explanation of why rice plants turn yellow, the invention of inexpensive, light, and handy electric wall-ramming machines, and so on. Lin Piao's recent directive on giving primacy to people's politics over professional work is another attempt to propagate the mass line in philosophy.

Efforts to encourage and publish philosophical research by the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers likewise constitute a major departure from the Soviet approach to philosophy. In 1965, *Zhexue Yanjiu* (*Philosophical Research*) devoted its sixth issue to 20 articles by workers, peasants, and soldiers arising from their studies of Mao's works, and again the whole of its second issue in 1966. These covered various practical applications of dialectics. Nineteen of these selections, which were translated into English and republished in *Peking Review* in 1966, are stylistically fresh and devoid of philosophical jargon, and are thus strikingly different from the highly professionalized and abstract treatments of similar topics by Soviet writers.

In their effort to emancipate philosophy from the laboratory as well as the classroom, Chinese Marxists have also tried to liberate it from the traditional monopoly of intellectuals. And this effort has little in common with the Soviet practice of playing up the intellectual contribution of dialectical materialism as providing a scientifically based or one-and-only correct way of solving the universal problems that agitate men's minds. As Marx noted in his *Theses on Feuerbach,* the new materialism is practical rather than contemplative, and disputes over the reality of thinking are of only academic interest unless related to practical questions.

In the Soviet view, dialectical materialism is designed principally to counter the influence of philosophies and ideologies alien to the working class; it is a means of class struggle on the cultural level for winning over the intelligentsia to socialism. Hence it is only indirectly concerned with changing the economic structure. For the Chinese, however, Marxist philosophy is di-

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rectly concerned with institutional change; hence it addresses itself to the masses even more than to intellectuals, to all areas of class struggle, including the struggle for production and for scientific experimentation in socialist societies. Soviet philosophers are verbally committed to similar goals, but their emphasis lies elsewhere. In effect, the Soviets are pushing for a professional line in philosophy, whereas the Chinese are championing a mass line tantamount to the ideological encirclement of the intelligentsia by the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers.

By giving pre-eminence within philosophy to materialist dialectics, and within dialectics to the method and practice of revolution, contemporary Chinese Marxism marks a return to the practical-critical emphasis of Marx's major works. Since the goal of Marxist philosophy, according to the Chinese, is militant activity rather than theory, revisionism may be conceived as any effort to moderate the critical and revolutionary thrust of Marx's method. Verbal adherence to this philosophy without corresponding practice is one of the more subtle instances of contemporary revisionism, and is interpreted by the Chinese as masking a fear and dislike of revolutionary action.

The image of the philosopher as a man of practical wisdom, if not a revolutionary, goes back to antiquity. Socrates in particular preferred to live philosophically than to write about it. Diogenes likewise left us the examined life as his philosophical legacy. The philosophical statesman or philosopher-king is crucial to Plato's model of the good life this side of heaven. Although practical wisdom is inferior to theoretical wisdom for Aristotle, both are needed in order to philosophize. Among the moderns, Benjamin Franklin comes closest to this image of the philosopher as a practical man, and the Philosophical Society he founded in 1744 continues to promote the kind of experimental investigations associated with his name.

Not until the industrial revolution did philosophy become professionalized and the unity of theory and practice give way to their disunity. To be sure, the philosophical ideal of the complete man eluded the reach of ordinary citizens, whereas professionalization made it accessible to educated members of a middle class. What they got, however, was not philosophy,

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at least not in the original sense, but an armchair vision of the world. And whether that vision was speculative and idealistic or scientific and materialistic made little difference in practice.

The forms of knowledge for the Chinese are less important than their application. In this light, Marx's organization of the Communist League in 1847 and of the International Workingmen's Association in 1864 were important philosophical achievements. In its capacity as a revolutionary tract, the *Communist Manifesto* can also lay claim to being a philosophical work, as can revolutionary propaganda in general. And as a revolutionary critique of the categories and corresponding ideology of bourgeois political economy, *Capital* is likewise a major philosophical contribution. As a way of life, philosophy for the Chinese does not consist of a body of positive doctrine or theory. One's actions are philosophical rather than one's beliefs, although the latter become philosophical in the process of transforming the world.

The Chinese version of the revolution in philosophy stands in the forefront of contemporary efforts in the Third World to de-Europeanize Marxism by abstracting it from the aristocratic-bourgeois heritage of culture which helps to mislead masses and to paralyze their revolutionary initiative. For thousands of years the tradition of European philosophy has represented the interests and disseminated the outlook of exploiting feudal and capitalist classes. Following the victory of the October Revolution in 1917, Soviet leaders failed to carry out a proletarian cultural revolution in earnest, with the result that bourgeois ideologies continue to obstruct, however imperceptibly, the development of socialist relations of production in the USSR. The legacy of European philosophy acts not only as a depressant upon revolutionary energies, but also breeds a new revision of Marxism every generation. Soviet failures to apply the lessons of the Paris Commune are traced by the Chinese to the continued vitality of this anti-proletarian legacy in the West.

The problem, as the Chinese see it, is to uproot the old decadent culture of the capitalist and feudal classes and to create a new proletarian culture that serves the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Failure to do so is to tolerate islands of revisionism within socialist societies that may eventually, as in the

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case of the Soviet Union, overwhelm both the Communist Party and the state. Since bourgeois culture in the East as well as the West is largely infused with European traditions, the de-Europeanization of Marxist philosophy is a necessary condition for the success of socialism in China, as well as the rest of the world. In effect, the proletarian revolution in philosophy requires socialists to take seriously the combined directive and prediction of the *Communist Manifesto*: "The communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas."

NOTE ON SOURCES

In addition to the works cited in the text, the principal English sources used in discussing the Chinese contribution to Marxist philosophy are Chou Yang's *The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences* (Peking, 1963) and the many relevant articles in the *Peking Review* (1966-1967). For the prevailing Soviet interpretation of Marxist philosophy and its relation to Marxism-Leninism I have relied chiefly on O. V. Kuusinen et al, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (Moscow, 1963) and V. Afanasyev's *Marxist Philosophy* (Moscow, 1964).

Every new truth which has ever been propounded has, for a time caused mischief; it has produced discomfort, and often unhappiness; sometimes disturbing social and religious arrangements, and sometimes merely by the disruption of old and cherished association of thoughts. . . . Men are made uneasy; they flinch; they cannot bear the sudden light; a general restlessness supervenes; the face of society is disturbed, or perhaps convulsed; old interests and old beliefs have been destroyed before new ones have been created. These symptoms are the precursors of revolution; they have preceded all the great changes through which the world has passed.

—*Buckle, History of Civilization*

It is the struggle for the ideal that counts, rather than the attainment of it.

—*Ibsen*

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NO COMMENT

The English edition of *Granma,* the official organ of the Cuban Communist Party, has five columns. In the issue of January 29, 1967, the two items reproduced below appeared at the top of columns 1 and 5 of the "General News" page (p. 10).—The Editors

U S S R AND CHILEAN GOVERNMENT TO COLLABORATE

• MOSCOW, January (TASS).—Agreements providing an important basis for commercial and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Chile are expected to be signed this week in Moscow.

It appears that for the success of this economic collaboration, Soviet credit is to be given to Chile under advantageous conditions.

One of the agreements has to do with the construction projects for industrial enterprises in Chile. The Soviet delegation, which visited this Latin American country several months ago, has stated that the collaboration may cover several branches of the Chilean economy.

The Soviet Union will supply machinery and equipment for the plants to be constructed with Soviet technical cooperation. The Chilean representatives had already expressed their readiness to purchase machinery and equipment from the Soviet Union amounting to sixty million dollars.

Trade relations between Chile and the USSR will also be increased. To date the USSR had purchased raw materials (mainly wool) from Chile. It is expected that the Soviet imports from Chile will in the future increase the percentage corresponding to finished and semi-finished items.

WHAT IS THE FREI GOVERNMENT?

• Frei's government represents the oligarchic, and pro-imperialist interests that oppose revolution and social-political transformation in the brother country of Chile.

It is a government at the service of the exploiting classes. Frei designated himself a "reformist" during his presidential campaign but has carried out no social change whatsoever. On the contrary, he has opposed every type of change in favor of the workers and peasants, and has supported the owners and employers, unleashing a wave of savage repression against strikes and popular protest movements. On the international scene, he maintains a policy of subservience to the dictates of the United States government. Defenders of the so-called "Alliance for Progress" support Eduardo Frei. His "reformism" and the "Alliance" are, in truth, one and the same aspect of imperialist policy in Latin America. That is why Frei and his government are considered one of the principal allies of imperialism.

Frei defends the interests that oppose the working classes.

In regard to Cuba, Frei is, in addition, an accomplice to the criminal imperialist blockade against our economy. For that reason, he is repudiated by every sincere revolutionary on this Continent.

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THE DAY THE COPS SMILED

BY ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

A policeman's face is not a happy one, and only rarely can a citizen look upon it with pleasure. I do remember a Sunday in 1950 when I sat down at an illegal bar in Denver with a humane cop who was respected by the Spanish-Americans, and there was a spring day in 1960 when a Pennsylvania state trooper was so thoughtful I was impelled to write Governor David Lawrence, who replied that my letter was quite unusual. From these limited data, it might be inferred that once in every decade a cheerful constable will be encountered. The astonishing truth is that the Great Peace March of April 15, 1967, revealed not one but dozens of smiling, friendly, New York City cops.

Why? After five hours of standing, waiting, walking, waiting, chanting, and waiting, I spoke to one of the officers assigned to guard us from the hecklers who were no more abundant and much less irritating than fleas. "How does it happen that so many cops are smiling today?" I asked.

"Look at it this way," the patrolman answered. "These paraders haven't caused any trouble. They have been peaceful and friendly. A cop responds to the crowd. You see what I mean?"

The countenance of the *New York Times* was not equally benign. In its lead editorial on the day of the march, the newspaper finally determined that the protest did not meet the *Times'* criteria for a political demonstration—the kind that Arthur Hays Sulzberger and James Reston cannot resist joining. The protest was a failure on moral grounds, the paper reasoned, because "All the morality is not and never was confined to one side in this miserable struggle." I suppose it could be argued

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Alexander L. Crosby left Greenwich Village seven years ago to feed birds and muskrats in Quakertown, Pennsylvania, where he also writes children's books.

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that it is immoral for a militia woman of North Vietnam to fire at the planes bearing gifts of napalm to her children, but only a *Times* editorial writer could expose the evil in her aggression.

The editorial concluded that the march was also a political failure because the goal was peace, not a more limited objective such as a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. If the marchers could be satisfied with a prolonged war against the people of South Vietnam only, Lyndon might bend a functioning ear. In short, ask for less than you want if you wish to get more than you expect. Union negotiators might keep this realistic rule in mind when they next approach the *Times* for a contract.

It was a cool day, around 50° Fahrenheit, yet the outpouring of human warmth was beyond anything I had ever experienced. One stylishly dressed lady carried a cloth bag filled with baked squab, a thermos of coffee, chocolate-covered marshmallows, and other necessities, which she gaily distributed to her companions. At 501 Madison Avenue a handsome young brunette in a second floor office held up a scrawled "Peace Now!" sign and led the temporarily stalled marchers in chanting the slogan. People were swept by friendship.

There was humor, too. A delegation from Princeton (the orange and black banner read, "Even Princeton!") halted behind St. Patrick's Cathedral, began a chant that was taken up by hundreds: "Draft Spellman!" Then a distinguished literary agent, glancing across the street to the offices of Random House, added in her clipped British accent, "Draft Bennett Cerf!" On a slope in Central Park, two solemn young men held a sheet as the parade went by. Large black lettering asserted: "Ho Chi Minh is a Virgin." This propaganda was probably motivated by nothing more sinister than a fondness for fun, which was shared by two young girls who had dressed themselves in one large box, topless and bottomless. It was labeled on all four sides: "Peace."

It was a mistake for the sponsors to attempt to restrict the slogans to an official and generally pedestrian list. Most marchers carried no signs, and those who preferred their own slogans ignored the prescribed ones. The only regulation enforced was the police ban on wooden sticks and poles. Marchers who had

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not brought paper tubes had to use umbrellas, string, or hands. My wife and I carried a placard reading, "Free Writers of Quakertown, Pa." It attracted a number of long unseen friends, greetings from residents of nearby towns, and a variety of questions from strangers. I explained that the organization had been founded the night before, with a membership of two. What the parade needed most was a vast array of signs with city, town, or even street names. The peace movement is nationwide. Let it proclaim its scope.

Some inspired organizer dreamed up the idea of a cap and gown section. Since this group was in the vanguard, we saw only a scattering of the academicians as they turned back after reaching the United Nations Plaza. All of these wore doctoral gowns; one had a daffodil pinned to the gold tassel of her mortar board. The daffodil was the accepted flower of the march, and flower-power may yet prove to be the force that all of the king's soldiers and secret weapons cannot overcome.

Although the march was a hell of a letdown to the master plotters of protests in the offices of the *Times,* the participants were elated. We ran from the terminal thunderstorm with a conviction that we had made a significant cry for peace; that the citizenry can fight the Pentagon; that we shall find new ways to reaffirm and enlarge our protest. There was a crucial difference between the last lap of the Selma-Montgomery march and this walk for peace. In Montgomery, except for the route through the Negro section, the marchers were hemmed in by hostile guardsmen and white spectators. The hate could be smelled. In New York, we walked with a sense of power and good will. "You are as yellow as your flowers!" a frenzied woman screamed, and the marchers grinned.

One big question among the paraders was how many of us there were. The official police estimate was later announced as 125,000, and this figure was generally accepted by the newspapers. Police and/or newspaper estimates are of course unreliable, because we haven't learned to count people as efficiently as we count bacteria.

A quarter-century ago, when I went to work for Federated Press, there was an office formula for estimating the size of the

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May Day parade: Combine the *Times* and *Daily Worker* estimates, and divide by two. On one unfortunate May Day, I decided to make my own tabulation. I stood all afternoon at Union Square, gauging the number of persons in each line and tallying the lines. My total was around 21,000, as compared with the police-*Times* estimate of 19,000 and the *Daily Worker* figure of 85,000. The reward for the most tedious reportorial effort of my life was angry denunciation as an arithmetical deviationist and a Social Democratic revisionist, plus a hint that our news service might no longer be required by one or two of the better paying customers.

During the 1967 march I conferred with a cop while we were held up by a traffic light. "This is an amazing parade," he said. "I have never seen anything like it, and I went to Washington for that civil rights demonstration. You have close to half a million here."

The officer was too generous, for it was impossible to move 100,000 persons an hour while making continuous halts for traffic lights. (This rate of parade flow would have required 80 persons in each line and no stops.) Yet the policeman's error was symptomatic. The march was a phenomenon that impressed almost everybody except Marya Mannes, reporter and critic, who wrote in the *New York Times* that "there was something inchoate and amateurish about the long procession which empathy for their cause and respect for their commitment could not dispel."

Miss Mannes was disturbed by "physical sloppiness" and absence of dignity, especially in the young. Noting that the leaders of the National Conference for New Politics had political goals, she concluded: "If the general public reaction to the march last week was any indication, they may even be forced to conclude that demonstrations of whatever size now accomplish very little indeed."

Certainly Miss Mannes was justified in taking a position well to the right of the enthusiastic leftists in the New York City Police Department. The parade was indeed amateurish. I recall one montage from battered cartons, made by 10-year-old Peter Hornick, with the message: STOP WAR. And very few

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of the young people looked as natty and dignified as an Air Force cadet prior to his expulsion for cheating. But I think the lady missed the point of the demonstration. There was no hope that thousands from the sidewalks would spontaneously join the ragged ranks or taxi home to write their Congressmen. The real achievement was the forging of a long needed alliance among a diversity of organizations and individuals.

The journey down Madison Avenue did not end at the United Nations. Martin Luther King, Jr., Benjamin Spock, and their colleagues will keep marching. Their political destination is already worrying the propagators of the war, who would have given little heed to a dignified demonstration that faded with the setting sun. Lyndon Johnson has not forgotten that Henry Wallace switched New York's electoral votes to Thomas E. Dewey in 1948 and came close to preventing the election of Harry Truman. Dr. King and Dr. Spock might prove more potent than the corn grower from Iowa.

It is much in vogue to speak of "aid and comfort to the enemy." But does the enemy fight us because we comfort him, or because we are driving him into an ever more determined defense of his homeland? The division of opinion that the Administration decries represents a profound and widespread doubt concerning our policies in Vietnam. The demonstrations do not manufacture this doubt; rather they bear witness to it, and it is a witness that cannot, and should not, be ignored.

It is the proper pride of our democracy that outlets are provided for individual and collective dissent. To accuse those who use them of treason, even murder, is as shameful as it is false, and I am appalled that spokesmen of my Government should make so facile and fatuous an association.

In characterizing demonstrators as Communist-inspired and unpatriotic, they give "aid and comfort" to a President all too willing to discredit every criticism in his anxiety to justify a war that brings to this country and the world ever greater misgivings and miseries.

—Professor Duncan M. Nelson, New York Times, May 5

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SOME REACTIONS TO THE REVELATIONS ABOUT THE CIA

BY H. H. WILSON

We publish below the notes from which Professor Wilson (of the Politics Department at Princeton) spoke to the National Council of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee in New York on May 13. In doing so we wish to associate ourselves with his interpretation of the meaning and significance of the CIA revelations.—The Editors

1. Most of those who received CIA funds were not innocents—they had their hands out.

2. The fact is that many students and scholars are eager to accept and live with the standards of "The Great Society"—not to mention labor leaders! And why not, isn't this the American Way?

3. Universities have, in effect, become part of the state apparatus and the corporate structure—and increasingly this becomes true of other institutions in the society.
   a. American universities have never been truly independent centers, so that in a sense these recent developments are merely an extension of an historical pattern.

4. It is doubtful that many of the recipients of CIA funds were actually "corrupted" by the money.
   a. Most of the individuals—as well as the institutions—have long accepted the premises of the Cold War.
   b. Certainly few scholars ever saw their role as that of independent critics, or observers of United States society.
   c. Few practiced or understood Professor Noam Chomsky's conception of the intellectual's role: "Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to analyze actions in terms of their causes and motives and hidden intentions. In the Western world . . . they have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. For a privileged

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minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth that lies hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, ideology and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us. . . . It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies." (*New York Review of Books,* February 23, 1967.)

5. Perhaps I am in error in *not* viewing this development of CIA activity as primarily an issue of civil liberties.
   a. True, it does represent the corruption of academic freedom, particularly that of students who are entitled to know special commitments of their teachers.
   b. But the point of the story, it seems to me, is the documentation of the extent to which universities, labor unions, religious organizations, publishing houses have been cut in on the racket society—I reiterate, they were not seduced.
   c. It demonstrates the extent to which all institutions in the society are incorporated in the state and corporate apparatus. This I would assume to be the essence of a totalitarian society.

6. The basic point about the CIA is not that it follows an independent policy—though it probably often does at the tactical level—but that its overall policy is approved by the highest officials of Government and the dominant party leadership.
   a. Increasingly it appears that intelligence agencies may guide the whole network of institutional control.
   b. Following the *Ramparts* disclosure, "The White House endorsed a report saying that the CIA had acted in accordance with Government regulations in its secret penetration of educational, labor and church groups. Mr. Katzenbach . . . praised the 'many far-sighted and courageous Americans who had quietly cooperated with the agency.' "
   c. Is this an admission that in addition to providing financial support for "educational, labor and church groups,"

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the CIA has also penetrated business organizations, including the mass media?

d. It should be recalled that we have extensive experience in the use of "scholars" and "independent" institutions as "fronts", e.g., the electric utilities in the 1920's and 1930's, and the oil industry's techniques in retaining lawyers and newspapers.

Conclusion:

7. It seems apparent that this CIA operation is a logical, even reasonable, operation for a government and a society operating on the assumptions of the Cold War and with a world counter-revolutionary mission.
   a. It is inevitable that the logic of the Cold War and the resulting policies should affect every aspect of American life.
   b. It may be seen in the distortion of science; in the merging of educational institutions with the corporate state; in undermining traditional safeguards against arbitrary power; in the official attempts to discourage dissent, opposition, political debate on alternative policies; and in the intensification of official deceit.
8. So long as the United States takes the lead in a world-wide counter-revolutionary movement in defense of vested interests, the corruption of domestic institutions and values is inevitable and, I believe, irreversible.
   a. All must be shaped to the "national purpose."
   b. No democratic society can embark on the domination of the world without corrupting its own foundations.
   c. And I suggest this will be intensified by the fact that (for the first time in the world's history, so far as I know) the United States intends to fight imperial wars with civilian conscripts rather than foreign mercenaries.
9. Thus, until the political direction of this country is changed, its role in the world drastically reduced or altered in direction, I believe we shall witness a continuing corruption of institutions and an erosion of declared values.

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

The Yankee Menace

Many years ago, when I first visited Latin America, I heard of "el peligro yanqui." The unilateral Monroe Doctrine, plus dollar diplomacy, implemented by Marines, hatched the phrase. Today the Yankee Menace extends far beyond Latin America. It is planet-wide: as Professor Frederick Schuman noted recently, "the United States is more feared and hated than any other nation or earth."

Is this statement accurate, or is it an exaggeration? I believe that it is accurate. I have traveled over the world, in many foreign countries, in recent years. Everywhere I have seen and heard the phrase "Yankee, go home!" The sentiment, if not universal, is widespread. There are good reasons for this.

American citizens who go abroad often say: "This place looks just like home: the same gas stations, the same cars, the same movies, the same soft drink ads. All are here!" One expects this similarity in Canada, but the pattern is widespread in Europe; it is developing rapidly in parts of Latin America and Asia. Americanism is spreading like a prairie fire across the planet.

If it is a prairie fire, burning and scorching everything in its path—traditions, customs, institutions, habits—then from the viewpoint of the older generation in foreign countries it certainly is an upsetting, destroying menace.

But, you may ask, why use the word "menace"? Why not say "the Yankee promise"? If the American Way of Life is the best way ever, and if the American Way is replacing a not-so-good local way, the change must be a blessing, even if somewhat unaccustomed and even unwanted.

I am reminded of the English lady traveling far from home. At a frontier, where passports were being examined and stamped, she encountered a sign "Foreigners This Way." She went and stood in the other line. "This way, madam. You're in the wrong

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line," said an official. "But I'm not a foreigner," the lady protested. "I'm British!"

Until very recently the English were at home everywhere because the sun never set on the Union Jack. Today the sun never sets on the Stars and Stripes.

American tourists are everywhere—in the best pleasure resorts, quartered in the most expensive rooms of the most exclusive hotels, making themselves at home and buying up the best of everything.

American tourists are accompanied by and finding nearly everything they are used to at home. American films, American foods, American soft drinks, American appliances, American hotels, American travel and tourist agencies, American business enterprises, American banks, American missions, American consular and information centers, and the impressive American embassies which stand out in almost every population center.

Another American feature of almost every landscape (in Europe especially) is the American in uniform—sailor, soldier, marine, flyer. Actually, at the moment, more than a million Americans in uniform are quartered outside of the United States. American warships patrol the oceans, American planes patrol the air, American military bases and posts circle the planet. While out of uniform are the ubiquitous plain-clothesmen who carry credentials and cash from the American Central Intelligence Agency.

Over all, there is the hoped-for American Century, during which the American Way of Life will be offered to all of the sons and daughters of men. If they accept the offer, they will enjoy American protection—and exploitation. If they decline or reject the offer, they will be conquered by military means or will be herded into the nooks and corners occupied by the lesser breeds. The choice will be simple: Are you pro- or anti-American? If you are pro, you must read the fine print and follow directions. If you are anti, we have the means to redirect your steps.

Uninitiated persons and those who have adjusted themselves to the last two decades of United States brainwashing may feel that these suggestions are premature. "Things are not

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that bad," they say. I can only reply in the words of a prominent United States publication: Today the United States is "the one super-power," standing head and shoulders above all competitors or rivals. It is first in productive power, in wealth, in foreign trade, in foreign investments, in foreign aid, in foreign alliances, in military striking power. The United States is *the* world power and as such is qualified and justified in proclaiming and implementing its supreme role during the American Century.

Rather quickly, as history goes, the British have been pushed from the power position which made them at home anywhere and everywhere. Today their places have been taken by the Americans, who are now playing the British role, reciting the British lines, and receiving the recognition and the plaudits reserved for the mighty who determine world policy and shape world destiny.

As the sun of history rises on the American Century it will soon be possible for Washington to parallel and outshine the British Victoria Jubilee of 1897. July 4, 1976, the two-hundredth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, might be an appropriate day for the announcement of U.S. suzerainty over the planet. In keeping with the event, as in 1897, a procession of military dictators and other chiefs of state might pass before the White House, bow low, and assist in celebrating the inauguration of the American Century.

Senator Fulbright on Vietnam

Students of the Vietnam War will welcome Senator W. J. Fulbright's newest book *The Arrogance of Power*. The book is moderately long—268 pages. It is fairly well documented. Its author, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ranks among the top half-dozen people in Washington in terms of their access to information otherwise classified and in terms of their status as policy-makers.

Senator Fulbright has taken his authorship seriously. The structure of the argument, his courage in reaching and stating conclusions, and the literary style are above reproach. I admire the Senator's ability to sum up large bodies of evidence briefly,

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with insight and with more than a little humor. It goes without saying that I do not accept his program for future United States action.

Chapter Five, "Vietnamese Revolution," provides a good example of his competence. At the outset he names the struggle in Southeast Asia as "another revolution" or, more exactly, "an Asian civil war which has been expanded into a conflict between the United States and Asian communism."

Why, asks the Senator, are United States forces fighting in Vietnam? For the same reason, he finds, that Washington intervened militarily in Guatemala in 1954, in Cuba in 1961, and in Santo Domingo in 1965. In both Latin America and Asia, the leaders of the Washington government have put opposition to communism before sympathy for national self-determination because they have rated communism as a "pernicious doctrine" and "a kind of absolute evil" which deprives its victims of freedom, dignity, and happiness. This official Washington view is not only the chief reason for involvement in the Vietnam War; it is likewise responsible for the "Asian Doctrine" under which "the United States is moving toward the role of policeman for all of Southeast Asia."

Just what is the crime of which the North Vietnamese are being accused, asks the Senator. He answers: "The crime is that they are communists." Clear away "the official rhetoric" about aggression, freedom, and the sanctity of American commitments and "we are still left with two essential reasons for our involvement in Vietnam: the view of communism as an evil philosophy and the view of ourselves as God's avenging angels."

Washington spokesmen, the Senator notes, state that they are fighting against North Vietnamese aggression. If the North Vietnamese will desist from aggression, the Washington administration says it will negotiate. And yet the North Vietnamese are taking part in a civil war, not in a foreign country, but in their own country, "a civil war in which Americans from ten thousand miles across the ocean are also participating."

Senator Fulbright turns to the "Asian Doctrine." Until recent years, he states, our commitments have been limited to specific countries and stated purposes, also that they would be

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undertaken collectively, under the United Nations or in cooperation with our allies. The emerging "Asian Doctrine" is a radical departure in American foreign policy "in that it is unilateral and virtually unlimited in its objectives." In pursuit of this policy "the United States on its own has undertaken to win a victory for its protégés in the Vietnamese civil war and thereupon to build a 'Great Society' in Asia." Later in the book the Senator asks whether anyone "ever thought of asking the Asians if they really want to join the Great Society."

In pursuit of this new policy, the United States is fighting in a war which is not international but "an insurrection in one part of a divided country supported by the other part." The most powerful nationalist movement in Vietnam is also communist. Ho Chi Minh is the chosen spokesman for the movement. It is worth remembering that "there is only one politician whose name is known to peasants all over Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh."

After a brief summary of recent Vietnam history, Senator Fulbright turns to the Geneva Agreements of July 1954, which prohibited the introduction into Vietnam of additional armed forces and provided that general elections should be held in July, 1956. They also stated that the line separating North and South Vietnam was "provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." While United States participants in the Geneva Conference did not sign the agreements, they pledged the Washington government to abide by them.

It is not possible to assign degrees of guilt for the violation of the Geneva Accords, Senator Fulbright writes, but "there have been violations by all concerned, including the United States." Hanoi's refusal to negotiate "may therefore reflect neither a preference for war nor confidence in victory but simply an unwillingness to believe that a negotiated settlement would be honored."

Senator Fulbright quotes Secretary McNamara as stating that the United States must take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a communist victory. Vietnam, the Senator comments, is "the only country in the world which won

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freedom from colonial rule under communist leadership." Furthermore, the Senator points out that "in South Vietnam as in North Vietnam the Communists remain today as the only solidly organized force." That fact, the Senator notes, "is the measure of our failure and the key to its possible redemption." " I strongly recommend, therefore, that we seek to come to terms with both Hanoi and the Viet Cong."

Question of the Hour

Beginning in February, 1965, the Washington government dumped more than 300,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnam, destroying property and snuffing out life.

Question: What kind of a world would this be if each nation which disagreed with the policies of a neighbor should turn international brigand and drop 150,000 tons of bombs across the frontier during the next twelve months?

Answer: There would not be enough of the world left to bother about.

Japan Comes Back

Eleven years ago I visited Japan for the second time. In February and March, 1967, I was there again. Changes since 1956 have been startling. All war damage is cleared away. The Japanese economy has advanced rather steadily and quite rapidly over the latest decade. In terms of industrial production Japan stands in sixth place among the nations. In ship-building she is easily in first place. In auto production Japan is third.

The Japanese economy enjoys a unique advantage, shared by only one other economy, that of Germany. The Japanese production plant is new. Antiquated buildings and obsolete equipment were bombed out during the war. In their places stands a brand new industrial complex.

These same trends are evident in Japanese transportation. Trucks, buses, taxis, and passenger cars clog city streets and make full use of an effective highway and thruway network. At a time when United States railroads are being neglected or torn up, Japanese railways have been electrified and new lines have been constructed, including high-speed express services.

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Furthermore, as a result of the war, debts were wiped out and incomes were lowered. These factors, linked with explosive energy and insistent drive, have stepped up industrial and merchandising efficiency. Despite high taxes, Japanese overhead costs remain relatively low. Consequently, Japanese products are pushing their competitors out of markets all over the world.

ARMED STRUGGLE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA

BY REGIS DEBRAY

Our July-August double issue will be a translation of this new work, already justly famous both here and abroad. Excerpts from this widely-discussed book appear below.—The Editors

"Marxist-Leninist" parties which do not fulfil their revolutionary duties must be prevented from constituting themselves into an association for the protection of threatened interests, thereby impeding the inevitable advent of new forms of organization and revolutionary action. By the name they bear and the ideology they proclaim, they occupy, *de jure,* the post of popular vanguard. If they do not occupy it *de facto,* they must not be allowed to keep the post vacant. There is no exclusive ownership of the revolution.

* * *

Any line that claims to be revolutionary must be able to give a concrete answer to this question: How to destroy the power of the capitalist state?

* * *

Fidel Castro says simply that there is no revolution without a vanguard and that this vanguard is not necessarily the Marxist-Leninist party, that those who want to make the revolution have the right and the duty to constitute themselves a vanguard, independently of these parties. It takes courage to state the facts clearly, as they are, especially when these facts challenge a tradition. There is no metaphysical equivalence between the vanguard and a Marxist-Leninist party. . . . Parties exist on earth and are subject to the rigors of terrestrial dialectics. If they have been born, they can die and be born in

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other forms. How does this rebirth come about? Under what form can the historic vanguard reappear? . . . Why do we declare that . . . there can be a revolution "with or without a party"?

* * *

For a revolutionary, failure is a springboard. It is richer in theory than is victory: from it experience and knowledge are accumulated.

* * *

Fidelista guerrilla experience points to the following paradox: the weaker the revolutionary nucleus the more it must mistrust alliances; the stronger it is, the more it can permit itself to seek such alliances.

* * *

The phrase "armed struggle" is brandished, repeated on paper and in programs, but the use of the phrase cannot conceal the fact that in many places the determination to carry out armed struggle is still lacking.

* * *

It is clear to all that today in Latin America the struggle against imperialism is decisive. If it is decisive, everything else is secondary.

* * *

United States imperialism's last hand will be played in Latin America. . . . Driven back as it will be from Asia, this is where it will perish. Its leaders know this. "For us, Latin America is more important than Vietnam," said the brother of an assassinated President of the United States . . .; and the empire is speedily making preparations for its own defense. . . . The last world empire is suffering its death agonies.

* * *

Reality is in code. Were it not so, it would suffice to read its meaning at sight, the path would be laid down, there would be no risk of error and . . . no need for . . . a science of history: Marx would have been able to follow the counsels of his mother and could have spent his life in amassing capital rather than writing it. . . . But the code which will permit the deciphering of an event, of a success or failure . . . must always be sought for. And it remains to interpret it afresh each time.

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THE PERMANENT PROMISE:
A Critique of the Liberal Books on Vietnam

BY HUGH DEANE

"Why we are in Vietnam is today a question of mainly historical interest," Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. declares in the first sentence of his *The Bitter Heritage;* and in a later chapter on the "inscrutability of history," he imposes limits on this interest. He nevertheless sketches the course of the American involvement, his small view of history enabling him to describe it as a series of decisions which were reasonable at the time, even though expectations were not realized. After Geneva, "the United States went ahead on the assumption that economic and political support alone would be sufficient to assure the survival of South Vietnam as an independent state. This was by no means an unreasonable judgment at the time." And again: "Each step in the deepening of the American commitment was reasonably regarded at the time as the last that would be necessary. . . . The Vietnam story is a tragedy without villains."

In retrospect the reasonable decisions of the moment become lost opportunities. Since 1945, Paris, Washington, and the Vietnamese "nationalists" have muffed one opportunity after another to make the revolution themselves—to prevail politically by democratic and reformist policies, at the minimum to create a regime backed by enough of the people to enable the military effort to

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Hugh Deane wrote *The War in Vietnam,* a Monthly Review Press pamphlet, in 1963. In a series of three articles in the *New York Daily Compass* in December, 1950, he concluded that for Washington, as well as for Paris, involvement in Vietnam was an adventure without hope of success.

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succeed. This is the theme of Robert Shaplen's *The Lost Revolution* and of liberal writing on Vietnam in general. It runs through the more substantial works of the late Dr. Bernard B. Fall, though qualified in several of his last essays. And it is present in *The United States in Vietnam,* by George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis; they see events in Vietnam as having been shaped by an early fusion of Communism and nationalism but find lost opportunities nevertheless.

What happened to all the reasonable decisions? Why were so many opportunities lost? Of course it is precisely at this point that these writers, so trenchant in particular criticisms, turn away with half an answer. In the main we are given a recital of "mistakes"—mistakes of all sorts, in understanding, in communication (Shaplen's favorite), in performance. The recitals are often rich in detail and accompanied with useful secondary insights; the ideas of Marxism are even occasionally applied in a gingerly fashion. But the mistakes and failures cannot be allowed to be so profound or so controlling that the writer is precluded from making one more appeal to Washington to make the American Revolution in Vietnam, which is how Fall concluded *The Two Viet-Nams.*

The past and present are such thickets of objective and subjective factors that much has to be put down as contingency. Yet those who judge a decision of the present to be reasonable or who find a lost option in the past, are required to play with the pieces on the board; they are obligated to search out and heed the underlying realities. In Vietnam these realities were not hidden from observers by what Schlesinger calls the murkiness of history. Rather they have been ignored or minimized by these liberals because of their commitment to an imperialism which, unable to endure a Red dagger thrust into Southeast Asia, has ever allocated to itself one more opportunity. The underlying realities in Vietnam have been those of revolution: a revolution in particular, one made by Vietnamese hands. Belittling and viewing statically this revolution, the Free World partisans have kept viewing hopefully situations in which the possibilities had been constricted, to say the least, by all that had happened before. It is one thing to create a neo-colonialist regime in an area where real revolution is largely a future threat; it is something else to do so in a period which began with a Communist-led seizure of power. A people who have come to the point of revolution, and who are in the throes of it, plainly cannot be so readily conned by the limited democracy, the rule of the slanted

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law, the inoculative reforms and minor benevolences which make up the optimum and preferred weapon of monopoly capitalism abroad as well as at home. But the problem confronting imperialism is more specific. The revolution is right now—organizations and armed forces in being and growing, people caught up with the idea they can make history and setting about it. For the counter-revolution it is an emergency. The problem of dealing with it tends to take on the force of a dilemma: The revolutionary presence must be destroyed and that means applications of force, heavy doses of force, yet what even those who do not like the revolution come to think of as the dirty war vastly limits the room for neo-colonialist maneuver.

In his *Vietcong,* an apparently CIA-linked study of the National Liberation Front based largely on captured documents, Douglas Pike dismisses as "a social myth in the Sorelian sense" the General Uprising which was the NFL goal. By this "social myth" the Communist-led Vietminh seized power in 1945. The political bureau of the Communist Party decided on a general insurrection in March and carried it out that August. A sort of original sin in all these books is their failure to deal realistically with this event. They treat it as if it were done with mirrors, stressing the fortuitous circumstances common to insurrections, and they fail to relate it meaningfully to what came before and to what followed. To Shaplen the post-insurrectionary situation was "pristine" and "fluid," and Fall in *The Two Viet-Nams* is largely preoccupied with venting his indignation at the dirty little tricks the OSS and Washington played on the French as they began their effort at reconquest.

"Tell the French people that the old revolutionary Phan Boi Chau sincerely desires loyal collaboration with France. But have them hurry or it will be too late!" So cried out a nationalist grown soft in 1931. The French did not choose that option; they did not make even a facsimile of the French Revolution. Rather they bloodily suppressed the strikes and rural uprisings of those years (trying the innovation of bombing villages), with the result that, in the judgment of Jean Chesneaux, "a chasm opened between the Administration and the people which was not to be bridged again." If there were opportunities, they were narrowing. Philippe Devillers in his *Histoire du Viet-Nam,* which remains untranslated, noted the "fragility" of the French hold in the prewar Indo-China of 1940; and while he too stressed the fortuitous character of the

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insurrection, he also called it "the logical end of the infiltration of the Viet-Minh into every sector of national life." No such sense of the withering away of the French colonial state emerges from Fall's account of the "colonial interlude" in *The Two Viet-Nams;* balancing political "mistakes" against exaggerated economic and social achievement, he lays the basis for a future of opportunity.

What the Vietnamese Communists call the August Revolution created an emergency for imperialism that has turned out to be permanent. To attempt to destroy it by armed intervention or to settle with it and hope to soften or subvert it—that was the problem handed to the French. It very well may be, as Shaplen suggests and as Fall eventually came to think, that the latter would have been the wiser course; France could hardly have done worse. But in any case the decision was made in 1946 against the background of a revolution on the move; the French were up against something more than a movement in the grip of privileged-class nationalists. In coping with famine, intervention, and the attempted coup of the Vietnamese Right during that terrible first year, the Communists maneuvered, wheedled, and made opportunist deals on all levels; but all this sort of thing was peripheral. The revolution developed its own pressures; the fire was spreading in the countryside; and the euphoria of the insurrection was turning into organized power. In March of 1954, Fall published in *Pacific Affairs* an article on "Local Administration Under the Viet-Minh," which he reprinted last year in *Viet-Nam Witness* under the title "The Grass-Roots Rebellion." But what is exactly missing from the article is any sense of the grass-roots rebellion which was already shaping the future in 1946. Already by December of that year the Vietminh had reason to believe it could strike with force against the French strategy of phased reconquest.

The American involvement in Vietnam began substantially in the winter of 1949-1950, a few months after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Was the commitment to the Bao Dai effort "reasonable"? Could it be believed that a decisive segment of a population that was fighting a revolutionary war and had fought off the French alone for four years would swing behind an "independent" regime headed by the Emperor in the white suit and crepe-soled shoes? It ought at least to be noted that Marxists, and some non-Marxists too, forecast that this would not happen—in assessments which are not to be found in the bibliographies of the liberal writers who treat the Bao Dai episode as if it were a

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tragic might-have-been. In the early 1950's, as before, the emergency was there. The Vietminh battalions were in the field, and much of the countryside was out of control. The French could not declare a recess while they constructed a viable neo-colonial regime; they had to keep burning and slaughtering. The Americans quickly got a taste of the problem. A "people-to-people" program designed to win hearts got nowhere, partly because even as they were handing out fertilizer and piglets in the villages, the Americans were equipping and financing the French to fight the dirty war. Shaplen reports the observation of Robert Blum, in charge of the aid program, that the effort was "greatly handicapped and its beneficial results were largely negated because the United States at the same time was pursuing a program of [military] support to the French."

In 1954 came the *déjà vu* of Diem. Again was it "reasonable" to suppose that American money and personnel and political support could make viable a privileged-class regime committed to absolute anti-Communism, to the proposition that a force admittedly supported by the majority of the people could be excluded from public life and indeed exterminated? Schlesinger thought so at the time, as well as retroactively; he lent his name to the Diem lobby, the American Friends of Vietnam. Fall, always the realist up to a point, saw only "a ray of hope" for Diem in 1954 and was still both hopeful and critical years later. Kahin and Lewis think that Diem had at least a two-year opportunity by grace of the Geneva provision putting off the elections until July of 1956. The general liberal view is that Diem lost his opportunity in large part because of his failure to win support in the countryside. They put down as a critical "mistake" Diem's decision in the summer of 1956 to turn out the existing village councils and replace them with Saigon appointees. But in reality the "emergency" created by the revolution was still present. The regular Vietminh formations had been transferred north of the 17th parallel, in accordance with Geneva, but there remained the Vietminh presence—in particular the councils and committees which had been in full or partial control of a great number of villages for years and which had carried out the land redistribution and begun the reconstruction of rural life. Indeed, in the first months after Geneva, the Vietminh expanded into areas held by the French. Diem had to choose between dealing with the Vietminh countryside by force or accepting the situation of fact in the hope of changing it by subtler means. If Diem made

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a "mistake," it was not out of simple wrong-headedness. Could it be supposed that the countryside as it then was would fall for the kind of phoney land reform which was all that Diem, a product of the land-owning mandarinate and in need of the support of that class, could offer? Would Diem's pure anti-Communist "nationalism" have prevailed in an even half-free countryside, or would it have run hard into revolutionary pressures or have been compromised into something like the neutralism which the Americans could not abide and which Diem's police were smashing in the cities? A few innocent professors from Michigan State once urged Diem to try democracy in the villages but quickly subsided. Diem's "mistake" was not his alone. American policy in general, and that of the CIA in particular, backed the hard line: the new village order and the "denunciation of Communism" campaigns and the return of landlordism that went with it. In 1958, indeed, Fall accused Diem of being too lenient with the Communists.

In 1961 came the serious effort and "opportunity" of the counter-insurgency. David Halberstam argues in *The Making of a Quagmire* that it need not have failed if Saigon and Washington had heeded the American advisers in the field. The general liberal view, the theme of Fall's lecturing articles, is that it failed because the political character of revolutionary war was not sufficiently realized and the reforms necessary to pacification were not carried out. The reality here was largely the old dilemma faced by the French. In 1963 the period of the Diem Mirage came to an end. Since then, Kahin and Lewis tell us, "the United States has had a series of opportunities for influencing South Vietnam's political development in a way that might have enabled it to secure a government in Saigon with a wider popular following." But Washington "was dedicated to the preservation of army rule in Saigon." The reality—and here Jean Lacouture's *Vietnam: Between Two Truces* is useful—is that the revolutionary emergency was present in covert form. In addition to producing revolutionaries, revolutions produce neutralists. Not all those in the political wings were true blue nationalists. Washington was precluded from any significant broadening and liberalization of the regime by the threat of a neutralist takeover, a defeat in very thin disguise; Vital Centrism was out in South Vietnam. Neutralism made the most of such relaxation after Diem as occurred, and fear that it would prevail is a key part of the background to Washington's decision to bomb the North and bring in American armed forces.

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Halberstam and the other reporters who wrote about what may be called the Period of the Illusion of the Green Berets, and Shaplen, turning his *New Yorker* pieces into a book as the American invasion was being mounted, cannot conceal their skepticism about the future, though they wind up pledging allegiance to the flag. Fall was deeply distressed by the succession of "lost options" and the spectacle of the American employment of obliterative weapons. In his introduction to *Viet-Nam Witness* he felicitated America for not being "a prisoner of history" but suggested that history does indeed offer some lessons and that those who made the decisions on Vietnam had ignored some of the "salient facts." And in an essay written in March of last year, the concluding one collected in the book, he put the French and American problem in Vietnam in terms of a dilemma:

> The French, for narrow colonial interests they were as yet unwilling to relinquish, felt that the time was not ripe for political freedom which could also turn against them. At the same time, anything less than complete freedom was resented as a sham by the majority of the population and thus lost its political effectiveness.
>
> Twelve years later, the United States, for far broader strategic interests—the credibility of American defense of a small state, the belief in the "stoppability" of wars of national liberation—also feels that the struggle for freedom would be self-defeating if it included the right to vote freely for tyranny. . . . In the long run, the population is likely to follow the side that offers it the most freedom—so the argument goes. But if we offer it that kind of freedom *now*, the Communists are the only group sufficiently organized to take full advantage of it. And the purpose of the whole war is, precisely, to keep them out.

Yet Fall kept his Free World notions to the day of his death on a Marine patrol. In the epilogue to *Viet-Nam Witness* he argued that the National Liberation Front is too great a reality to be ignored and that some accommodation must be sought with it, but he could only offer a variation of the plan of the Marshall Mission to China: An approach to the NLF would give Washington "a measure of the political initiative," would split Hanoi and the NLF, and "would permit the emergence in Saigon of those elements which still command a measure of popularity and countryside respect." Kahin and Lewis recommend the same sort of thing, pinning their hopes on the rise of a political Center following de-escalation of the war. Schlesinger's "middle course" differs only in details. While

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American forces carry out "clear and hold" operations and back reforms by a "pro-peasant" government, the NLF is to be offered participation in a coalition regime and "free elections"—provided that it lays down its arms and opens up its territories while accepting the presence of American and Saigon armed forces. In short, opportunities remain.

Indeed, the series of opportunities is open-ended. A nihilification of history goes hand-in-hand with the recourse to obliteration. Through the years every turn of the page has been a pristine opportunity, and when realities have intruded and the pages have turned out not to be blank, they have to be made so by the military eraser. Yet the swelling horror cannot be allowed to be a tragedy with villains. It never comes to Cry Halt! Always there is a hopeful tomorrow. The Permanent Revolution is countered with the Permanent Promise.

When a good book on the French and American interventions in Vietnam is written, it will show that neither the revolution nor the counter-revolution always made the most of the forces at their disposal; but in the main it will not be a study of "lost opportunities" but of the narrow basis for counter-revolutionary politics. It will show how, brought up against a great revolution, the comedy of the export version of American liberalism turned into a farce.

BRIEF NOTES ON NEW BOOKS ON VIETNAM

The United States in Vietnam, George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The Dial Press, New York, 1967, 465 pp. $5.95.

The authors believe that Washington so feared a monolithic communism that it lost its opportunity to align itself with the Vietminh and turn Vietnam into an anti-Chinese rampart. Unilateral American intervention in what is basically a civil war, they say, is worsening the world position of the United States and destroying the basis for a political solution. They urge a cessation of the bombing of the North and less military and more political activity in the South. There they envisage an "international supervisory body," a revival of the non-Communist "suppressed political forces," and an "accommodation" between them and Saigon and the National Liberation Front. Apart from the conclusions and particular propositions, this is the most realistic general account so far of the American involvement in Vietnam. Key documents and statements, including those of the NLF, are reproduced in appendices totaling 100 pages.

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The Bitter Heritage, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1967, 126 pp. $3.95.

One of those demibooks, handsomely manufactured, that is publishable and of interest because of the status and reputation of the author.

Viet-Nam Witness: 1953-66, Bernard B. Fall, Praeger, New York 1966, 363 pp. $6.95.

A collection of 26 of Fall's many articles, arranged to illuminate the flow of events. The fact that the earlier articles could be reprinted indicates that Fall has always been more realistic than his fellow academic specialists; the later essays, plus several written after this book went to press, make up his best work. The impact of escalation led him to revise for the better some of the judgments in *The Two Viet-Nams* and other earlier writings. This book, like all of Fall's works, is richly informative and will serve the writers of the better books to come. A bibliography of Fall's writings is included.

Vietnam North, Wilfred G. Burchett, International Publishers, New York, 1966, 191 pp. plus photographs. $4.95 cloth, $1.95 paper.

Preparing for a long war, North Vietnam is going through what Burchett calls "another gigantic revolution," characterized by decentralization, dispersion, and reliance on local initiative and resources: cities and the first large-scale industry have to be written off and once again the countryside made the base. The book is an account of what Burchett saw during visits totaling seven weeks; interviews with Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Vo Giap, and Nguyen Van Vinh give the perspective of the leadership. Burchett avoids touchy subjects and does not give us a thorough appraisal, but he is a skilled and informed reporter and he conveys a sense of the vitality of the Vietnamese Northerners and their revolution.

America's Vietnam Policy: The Strategy of Deception, Edward S. Herman and Richard B. Du Boff, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1966, 123 pp. $2.00.

The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam, Franz Schurmann, Peter Dale Scott, and Reginald Zelnick, Fawcett Publications, Greenwich, 1966, 160 pp. 60¢.

"When the leaders curse war/ The mobilization order is already written out" Brecht's lines could have served as the epigraph for these two books, which examine the deception of the "search for peace" and the reality of the decisions to intensify and broaden the war The analysis by Herman and Du Boff is the more forthright; in addition to the verbal manipulations that cloaked escalation, they deal, in appendices, with the unheld 1956 elections, the "independence" of South Vietnam, and the questions of aggression and genocide. *The Politics of Escalation,* the work of many hands, is gentler in its conclusions and written in committee

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prose, but its chronological approach has a powerful cumulative impact. Twenty-nine prominent individuals, all respectable, sent it to President Johnson as a "Citizens' White Paper." He ignored it.

Vietcong, Douglas Pike, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1966, 490 pp. $8.95.

This appears to be one of the projects M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies undertook for the CIA before it severed (it says) the connection last summer. Pike says he takes "a communicational view of social change"; his regular job is dispensing "information" in Saigon. At his best he merely tends to worry the obvious; at worst he serves up as fact generalizations based on Saigon cafe gossip (he asserts, for example, that the epitome of the current attitude of South Vietnamese to the war against the French is that it was a "mistake"). Yet a book so full of quotations from captured NLF documents cannot be all bad. We are reminded that revolutions are really made, and given some concrete information about how it was done in South Vietnam. A useful complement to Burchett's earlier *Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War.*

The Lost Revolution, Robert Shaplen, Harper, New York, 1965, 404 pp., $6.95 cloth, $1.95 paper.

The Vietnamese Communists are the "native internal enemy"; ranged against them in this lightweight account of events from 1945 on are the "bona fide nationalists." Shaplen was close to various American officials and Vietnamese rightists and is therefore now and again able to provide information that becomes useful when rearranged.

THE POINT STILL IS TO CHANGE IT

BY KARL MILLER

One Dimensional Man. By Herbert Marcuse, Beacon Press: Boston, 1964. $6.

To hold that advanced capitalist society has all but perfected the means of taming those internal conflicts which might have made for its radical transformation, while insisting that such a

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Karl Miller is the pen name of a professor of philosophy at a large North American university.

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change is badly needed, is to abandon the clash of irreconcilable social interests for the clash of incompatible critical theses. If this does not quite set Marx in the position he thought characteristic of Hegel, it could, at least, leave him flat on his back. Either way, he will have outlasted his usefulness.

When the proponent of this reversal is, like Herbert Marcuse, a thinker sympathetic to Marx, then it is time to sit up and take note—if only to be aware of what this reversal signifies.

For, if the goal of radical change is to be a real alternative, rather than a consummation devoutly to be desired, there must be agents of change—men and women whose awareness of their situation is such that Marcuse's postulated need can become for them a motive for entering the fight for change.

Yet, if Marcuse's main thesis holds water, i.e., if radical change is no longer on the agenda, then it follows that this first possibility is foreclosed. In which case the need for change remains a merely worthwhile ideal, a vision in which to find solace when the going gets tougher. History will have turned out to be a revolving door, ushering us deceptively back on to the sidewalks of utopian socialism.

On the other hand, if there is no *a priori* reason for ruling out the possibility that more and more people will come to feel the need for a radical change of our societies, then it is Marcuse's main thesis which is false.

It is therefore of desperate importance to pay close attention to Marcuse, to find out whether he makes any case for his main point, and, if so, by what methods he has arrived at his conclusions.

In summary, his basic argument, shorn for the moment of its Freudian trappings, is that it is not so much the structure of prevailing economic, social, and political relationships which determines the use and function of the industrial apparatus; rather, it is this apparatus which increasingly regulates the structure and quality of our lives.

The machine is really a Frankenstein, which by generating and satisfying bogus needs has, bit by bit, grown to enslave and terrorize its creators. But the terror is so beguiling, subtle, insistent, and seductive, that it is not seen for what it is; indeed it is positively welcomed and is therefore unlikely to generate any counterthrust which would control the machine and change the nature of society.

Accordingly, no advanced society—whatever the form of own-

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ership of its productive resources—is really immune to the process he describes. Nor does Marcuse wish to make exceptions. On the contrary. He obviously thinks that some such thesis as this is required to explain why such structurally dissimilar societies as the USSR and the advanced capitalist countries share what he takes to be the same repressive and coercive features.

Inescapably, the technological terror dominates, too, the prevailing modes of thought—as exemplified in the natural and human sciences, in philosophy, in art, in journalism, in TV, and in the most common forms of speech. Marcuse is really only interested in this aspect of his case. Half the book is given over to it. Much of what he says in these passages is full of fine insights—though he can be a seriously misleading guide who spoils his case by a penchant for overstatement. Moreover, even though he affects to be analyzing advanced industrial societies, his concern is almost exclusively with what he takes to be the intellectual life of the United States.

But before we accompany him on this road, it is absolutely necessary to scrutinize his point of departure. To perceive how schematic and perfunctory Marcuse's approach to his case is, one need only note that in a book published in the midst of growing Negro agitation—Malcolm X, endless demonstration, countless unsatisfied demands, the ominous rumblings from the ghetto—there is but fleeting reference to what, in conjunction with other forces, could very well become the most significant countervailing trend in the United States: the gradual awakening of the Negro from his long, brutally enforced subjection.

True, he makes reference to the "outcasts and outsiders," and he admits that this struggle has a chance, if only a very dim one. But, inevitably, this trend appears negligible, given the lack of any serious analysis and his irresponsibly romantic way of posing the problem.

If one chooses to set up in business as aloof soothsayer then the least that one should do, for the sake of plausibility if for no better reason, is to present the solid evidence on which one's extrapolations rest. But Marcuse's justified scorn for the positivist veneration of the "pure fact," unalloyed with any mixture of values, is almost totally indistinguishable from his unwarranted disdain for facts as such, in the light of which one could assess his claim.

His failure to grasp the importance of the Negro struggle is of a piece with his failure even to mention the growing struggles

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for national liberation in the equally long exploited, poorer enclaves of monopoly capital, often whimsically and irresponsibly called the "Third World."

When Marcuse does take cognizance of the underdeveloped capitalist colonies it is only to pose the question whether, as "third force," they have a chance of introducing the machine without having their lives mangled by it. He is very skeptical that there is such a chance, and later adds: "Moreover, indigenous progress would presuppose a change in the policy of the two great industrial power blocs which today shape the world—abandonment of neo-colonialism in all its forms. At present there is no indication of such a change." (p. 48)

This is way off base. It never seems to have occurred to Marcuse that a serious critical inquiry into the condition of these countries is not a Rousseauean search for the noble savage who might possess a secret formula which has eluded his sophisticated brethren. The questions raised by a theorist reflect the power or poverty of his theory.

First, he fails to see these societies as part of the capitalist world—and a vital part at that—a failure common among liberal ideologues, Communists who want a quiet time of it, and, regrettably, many young left radicals. Neo-colonialism, to use his term, becomes a purely geopolitical escapade indulged in by the Soviet Union and the West as a phase in their long-standing competition. This is the standard Cold War myth.

Now, however far the USSR may be from being the embodiment of socialism, however crass and dictatorial its relations with the underdeveloped capitalist world may sometimes be, however narrowly nationalistic its motives for entering these relations, its links with these countries are not the same as the relationship of the United States to Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Put bluntly, United States monopoly capital owns, controls, and exploits an increasing amount of the productive resources of these areas, which, whether it be in the form of raw materials or return on investment, flows back as an addition to the resources of the imperial power. This is imperial tribute on the grandest scale the world has seen. And it must not be forgotten that the lesser imperialisms of England and France, despite the dismantling of overt political controls, are by no means altogether extinct.

Not only is Marcuse's question again badly posed, but he is

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seriously misguided in talking about the United States abandoning its "policy." It is not a "policy," not something that can be turned on and off, but a way of life, a form of economic and political exploitation, such that the United States cannot really contemplate the possibility of these countries moving towards real independence.

Had Marcuse an inkling of this, he would have seen that the relevant and important questions are: What are the prospects for these countries following Cuba's example and freeing themselves of this economic overlordship? What forces in the United States would be strengthened by the national liberation struggles? How many military interventions against these struggles can the United States afford? How many can it fail to afford? How can the Negro and others demanding change harness the economic and social dislocation which will result in the United States when the United States government intervenes abroad? Can the radical forces in the United States ever come to see clearly, as Malcolm did, that their cause is the cause of the still oppressed colonial peoples? And vice versa?

On Marcuse's model much that goes on in the world today, including Vietnam, can only be a mystery, or, what is the same thing, a further phase in the triumph of the technological *Zeitgeist*. For him, there can be none of the complex interrelations that the foregoing list of questions presupposes.

His treatment of matters in Western Europe is as perfunctory, and his selection of evidence sketchy and banal. Here too, if one had the space, one could indicate a constellation of conflicting interests which do not tend to a state of equilibrium. Not the least of these are the still underling tension and muted conflicts between national capitalisms, the constant treadmill of inflation and deflation, large areas of poverty and backwardness.

As with the United States, none of this adds up to a formula for instant radical change. These things never do. But they are factors of importance to those who want a sane and rational future.

When it comes to the USSR, the irrelevance of his theory is even more glaring. Can anyone see the tortured, complex events of the last 30 years as successive moments in the progress of the machine? Yet the only alternative that Marcuse vouchsafes is "the situation of hostile coexistence" which "set in motion the forces which tend to perpetuate technical progress as the instrument of domination." (p. 42) "Hostile coexistence," a complex of interrelated events, becomes an abstract datum which sets the process

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going. This is poetic license, not explanation.

Characteristically, the only disruptive force he notes is itself technologically generated, i.e., automation. But no real data are presented for assessing the probability that under capitalism this style of production will become widespread. This lacuna is only to be expected in an analysis which never even descends to the most rudimentary considerations of economic matters—considerations which might well have shown that the social reality is more multi-faceted than Marcuse suggests.

But these innumerable and vital distinctions, which imply that human beings are not input-output systems, cannot find an echo within Marcuse's analysis, given his obsolete model of motivation. "The people" are pictured entering the present industrial phase as "pre-conditioned receptacles of long standing." (p. 8) The preconditioning Marcuse finds is that which his theory puts there. For whether he realizes it or not, what he shares with the version of behaviorism he ridicules, is essentially the conception of a causal bond which runs from the environment to the individual. He differs only in not seeing consciousness as a blank sheet on which the environment writes its instructions.

Marcuse takes over from Freud the view that society thwarts the alleged basic instincts by which men are motivated. For Freud, insofar as repression is the very factor which makes for social and cultural attainments, sublimation is the inescapable lot of civilized man. In his earlier work, *Eros and Civilization,* Marcuse, in contrast to Freud, saw repression itself as generating the drive to transform organized society. He therefore envisaged a truly liberated civilized existence.

But now that the managers of advanced industrial society pander to sexuality, throw in a Cadillac or two, disguise the gap between shop floor and boardroom, a non-liberating satisfaction of basic instincts is the order of the day. Exit sublimation, and down the psychic disposal unit goes the urge to overcome or change the state of things. An orgy a day keeps the revolution away.

This is a large claim, which, if it is to have any explanatory value, must be empirically testable. But as employed by Marcuse, it really is nothing more than an extended rewording of his definition of advanced industrialism: the stage in which, as he claims, the proletariat has been incorporated into civil society.

But this rewording places the thesis in an even less convincing light. Marcuse is really talking about the so-called welfare stage

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of capitalism; and it is wrong to suggest this was forged on high and handed down to the peoples below in order to keep them quiet. It had to be fought for, and the battle is by no means over.

If these advances have contributed to the apparent stability of capitalism they have in turn helped to give rise to new and still unfulfilled demands—shorter working hours, a rise in real income, better education, the elimination of still widespread poverty, etc., etc. This shows how misguided Marcuse's model of motivation is. Historically, wants and needs grow by what they feed on—the satisfaction of earlier wants and needs. It also shows that capitalist societies have not been able to transcend or altogether mask their inherent instability.

But to point this out is to indicate once more that (a) social and economic relationships are complex and interwoven, and (b) the relationship between men and their social institutions is dialectical and not linear. Marcuse's theory cannot even get to grips with the social data, and so is of little empirical value.

Lack of complex and conflicting details also vitiates his claim that thought has now become predominantly one-dimensional. That Madison Avenue, TV companies, newspapers, government bureaucrats, often talk and act as if human beings were infinitely pliable is, in a general way, true. This vein has long been mined by pop sociologists. But Marcuse, though he generally agrees with these writers, evidently does not consider his work as one more contribution to this genre. In fact, he obviously believes he is making good the lack of theory which pop studies of the subject display. He fails to come up to his own standard.

To take but one example, which could be multiplied many times, he never points out to his readers that, though the terminology of stimulus and response is retained in many psychological theories, these terms frequently receive a changed interpretation within the framework in which they are imbedded. He writes as if the classically simple S-R theory always holds sway.

But in cybernetics and information theory, for example, there is an attempt to see behavior as intentional response to various, but not unlimited, possibilities. This is a rejection of simple causal determinism in favor of a model which integrates causal and purposive explanation. As such it is not very different from what Marx meant when he said that men make their own history but not in circumstances of their own choosing.

The great shortcoming of social scientists in the United States

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is not so much their attempt to see behavior as conditioned response (though there are still weighty criticisms to be made here), but rather their assuming without question that future societies will be structurally similar to today's capitalist countries. They love to claim that their work is value-free, but this is pure humbug. It is simply that they attach an overriding value to the present and refuse to judge present performance in terms of future capacities.

Marcuse sees this clearly; but instead of exposing, in a patient and detailed way, the philosophical underpinning of this assumption, he prefers to indulge in a sustained exercise in Olympian despair, relieved here and there by flashes of brilliant perception.

But these flashes are eclipsed by his lumping together and dismissing nearly all forms of contemporary thought in the United States. Linguistic philosophy, sociology, the use of mathematical models in science are all treated as so many manifestations of the one prevailing technology ideology. In this way not only does he trivialize the notion of ideology, but he fails to separate what may be of enduring value in these disciplines. One does not have to be an uncritical devotee of present-day philosophy, for example, to admit that all of it is not trivial, as Marcuse suggests.

Further, his muddled attack on the use of mathematical models in the physical sciences—he calls it the "mathematization of Nature"—stems from a backward-looking, sentimental view of the natural world. There is a deep romantic hostility to scientific thought in Marcuse's work. Marxists should be the first to object to this.

What is ultimately disturbing about this book is the author's belief that there can be a point outside of society from which society can be assessed. This stance is forced on him, he says, by the present state of things. This is pure Archimedean fiction. If one voices the belief that things are pretty hopeless, then this is not without practical consequences.

A very long time ago Aristotle pointed out that there is a crucial difference between theorizing about inert matter and theorizing about men: the sequel of practical reasoning is an act. The limiting case would be that in which one concluded that no act was possible. But, not so paradoxically, this quietism is a form of activity—at best a positive reinforcing of the present state of things. Aristotle's point was not lost on Marx. Hence his famous dictum: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

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Marcuse establishes Marx's words in reverse. Those who claim the world cannot be changed are only interpreting it in one more way. However, the point still is to change it.

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CORRESPONDENCE

In the May issue we published two angry criticisms of Paul Jarrico's "Carol for J. V. Stalin" which appeared in the March MR. These criticisms in turn evoked a number of replies, of which we publish two below. Norman Reider is a San Francisco psychiatrist who has written for MR before (December, 1957), and Ross Gandy is a philosopher at the University of Texas.—The Editors

A Little Nonsense?

To the criticism of Paul Jarrico's "Carol" I must counter by writing that it is indeed sad that the critics cannot take such levity except as a threat to the revolutionary spirit. What nonsense!

Sure, the poem is flippant, careless, and all that. But, cannot revolutionaries tolerate a little nonsense?

Such rigidity, lack of a sense of humor, and zealousness in trivialities makes for dictatorships which oppress artists, poets, and ordinary folk who don't adhere to the "line" with every word, every breath and every effort. And once such inhumanities are committed it takes decades for the alienation to be corrected—if ever.

Norman Reider

San Francisco, May 15, 1967

It Was Funny!

For those of us on the New Left the furor against the Jarrico poem on Stalin (MR, March) comes as a surprise. I'm a Marxist. I appreciate Stalin's achievements. I'm not above drinking a glass to the Old Man on May Day. But surely Jarrico's satire is straight to the point: Stalin was the god of all dogmatists, a god made flesh, and his spirit does live on.

Jacoby's letter (MR, May) criticizing the poem worries about an "uncharacteristic lapse of taste." But that kind of judgment depends on who's doing the tasting. The Old Left

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has strange tastes, and our generation suspects they have never completely de-Stalinized.

In *Teacher and Friend of Mankind,* an essay written to celebrate Stalin's sixtieth birthday (1939), Poskrebyshev tells this anecdote:

> An old collective farm woman wrote thanking Comrade Stalin for her happy life and asking him to accept a cow as a present. Comrade Stalin wrote back thanking her for her gift, but said that he did not need a cow and advised her to keep it as a souvenir of himself.

A souvenir of himself. Perhaps this was fitting—in more ways than one!

This cult of personality left a permanent emotional deposit in the thinking of Marxists in the Soviet Union and in the United States. De-Stalinization is not yet complete in the Soviet; has the American Left finished the job here? I speak for many who doubt it.

Therefore: we applaud your publication of Jarrico's poem. And after all—politics, taste, and generations aside—it was funny!

Ross Gandy

University Socialist Committee
The University of Texas

The apologist for oppression becomes himself the oppressor. To palliate crime is to be guilty of its perpetration. To ask for a postponement of the case, till a more convenient season, is to call for a suspension of the moral law, and to assume that it is right to do wrong, under present circumstances.

—*William Lloyd Garrison, The Liberator*

Nearly half of *Fortune's* 500 largest U.S. companies today have extensive overseas investments in plants, mines, or oil fields, representing an aggregate stake that is on the order of $50 billion. A score or two of these large companies now have a third or more of their total assets abroad; even a greater number derive a third or more of their income from foreign sales through one channel or another.

—*Raymond Vernon, Harvard Business Review, March 1967*

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(*continued from inside front cover*)

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Publication plans are now complete for two other new MR Press books which have not previously been announced. On September 28 a collection of Frantz Fanon's political essays will be published under the title *Toward the African Revolution.* Fanon needs no introduction to MR readers—his *Studies in a Dying Colonialism,* on the Algerian war of liberation, was published last year by MR Press. The price on publication of *Toward the African Revolution* will be $6.50. Meanwhile, the prepub price is $5 (and of course the price to Associates is and will remain $3.25). The other new book, which will also be published on September 28th, is *The Socialist Register, 1967,* edited, like its predecessors with the same title, by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. Among the contributors to this latest *Register,* in addition to the editors who each have an article, are the French Marxist Maurice Godelier, Conor Cruise O'Brien, and Ernest Mandel, a translation of whose *magnum opus, Traité d'Economie Marxiste,* will be published next year by MR Press. *Register* prices are: list—$6.00 (cloth) and $3.45 (paper); see page 62 for full details.

The double summer issue, which will be the next one after the present issue, will contain a complete translation of the much discussed booklet *¿Revolución en la Revolución?* by Régis Debray,, together with an editorial introduction and commentary. As the English title we have decided to use the subtitle of the French edition: *Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America,* which gives a more accurate idea of what the book is about than the original title. Régis Debray is a young French teacher of philosophy who went to Latin America several years ago and has made an intensive study of the revolutionary movements of that continent. During 1966 he was in Cuba where he was given access to much unpublished material on the war of liberation. Since publication of the work, the Cubans have made clear in many ways that Debray has accurately reflected the revolutionary thought of the Cuban leadership, which means primarily of Fidel Castro. In April of this year, it was announced in La Paz, Bolivia, that Debray had been captured by government forces while with the guerrilla forces operating in the southern part of that country. As of this writing, nothing more is known of his subsequent fate. An idea of the style and spirit of Debray's essay can be gathered from the excerpts printed on page 38 of this issue.

This is the time of year when we must repeat a plea of former years. If you are going to be on vacation in July and want your magazine to follow you, be sure to send us your vacation address. The double summer issue will be delivered in early July. After that the next issue will be in September. It follows that if you are planning to be away only during August and through Labor Day in September, there is no need to let us know your vacation address. And if you are moving permanently, you should notify us at once, including both the new and the old addresses with the zip code.

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